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a fair head-to-head comparison From a high-level perspective, it is clear that both dialects incur signi cant performance overhead CCured seems to fare better, with its performance penalty typically in the range of 10% to 60%, with a maximum sample performance penalty of 85% for OpenSSL [CCured, 2006] Even on signi cantly smaller projects, Cyclone produced average performance penalties on the same order as CCured, but with maximum penalties as high as 185% [Cyclone, 2006] Dynamic Buffer Over ow Protections It s human nature to seek simple solutions to dif cult problems; preventing buffer over ow vulnerabilities is no exception There have been many attempts to detect or prevent buffer over ow exploits without addressing their root cause (bad code) All of these approaches have been defeated [Hogland and McGraw, 2004] Don t be tricked into a sense of complacency by band-aid solutions This section discusses the following types of dynamic protections that focus on changing the binary representation of the program or the environment in which the program executes: Non-executable memory segments Compile-time instrumentation Virtual execution environments Hardened system libraries

Sort alarms Filter alarms Delete an alarm Undo the deletion of an alarm Change an alarm's status--for example, by acknowledging or closing the alarm Add notes about an alarm

NODE COMPONENT OBJECTS ALLOW_CULL_FACE_READ ALLOW_CULL_FACE_WRITE ALLOW_MODE_READ ALLOW_MODE_WRITE ALLOW_OFFSET_READ ALLOW_OFFSET_WRITE

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The chapter concludes with benchmark results for some of the more popular dynamic buffer over ow protections The data show that most popular protections fail to stop a majority of representative exploits Non-executable Memory Segments Various hardware and operating system vendors have attempted to prevent buffer over ow exploits by limiting code execution to certain areas of memory The typical approach involves tagging individual memory pages with a bit that indicates whether the system should execute code loaded from the page In practice, this solution has proven reasonably effective against simple attacks, which often rely on injecting malicious code into data variables on the stack and causing the vulnerable program to jump into and execute the code Furthermore, when implemented in hardware, such as the No-Execute (NX) bit from AMD and the Execute Disabled (XD) bit from Intel, non-executable memory segments add minimal overhead to a program s execution However, any nonexecutable memory segment approach

These ags, when enabled using the setCapability method, allow an application to invoke methods that read and write its individual component eld information Constructors

.

public PolygonAttributes() public PolygonAttributes(int polygonMode, int cullFace, float polygonOffset)

public final void setCullFace(int cullFace) public final int getCullFace()

HTML pages, the browser makes a set of requests for smaller and more speci c pieces of information These requests look much like Web Services calls Without making an effort to prevent it, many Ajax implementations leave the door open for attackers to steal data using these calls: we term this attack JavaScript hijacking The X in Ajax is a bit deceptive Instead of XML, a large number of Ajax applications communicate using JavaScript syntax, the most popular form of which is JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Unless they implement speci c countermeasures against it, many Web applications that transport data using JavaScript syntax allow attackers to read con dential data using a technique similar to the one commonly used to create mash-ups Normally, Web browsers enforce the Same Origin Policy in order to protect the con dentiality of user data The Same Origin Policy requires that, in order for JavaScript to access the contents of a Web page, both the JavaScript and the Web page must originate from the same domain Without the Same Origin Policy, a malicious website could serve up JavaScript that loads sensitive information from other websites using a client s credentials, cull through it, and communicate it back to an attacker JavaScript hijacking allows the attacker to bypass the Same Origin Policy in the case that a Web application serves up JavaScript to communicate con dential information The loophole in the Same Origin Policy is that it allows JavaScript from any website to be included and executed in the context of any other website Even though a malicious site cannot directly examine any data loaded from a vulnerable site on the client, it can still take advantage of this loophole by setting up an environment that allows it to witness the execution of the JavaScript and any relevant side effects it may have This is not a problem for non-Ajax web sites because they generally don t communicate con dential data in JavaScript The code in Example 1010 implements the client-side of a legitimate JSON interaction from a Web application designed to manage sales leads (Note that this example is written for Mozilla-based browsers).

These methods set and retrieve the face culling ag for this PolygonAttributes component object The face culling ag is one of the following: CULL_NONE: Performs no face culling CULL_FRONT: Culls all front-facing polygons CULL_BACK: Culls all back-facing polygons

In a detailed alarm view, enable users to request information about each active and inactive alarm for the monitored entities in that view When displaying alarms in a detailed view, show the severity of each alarm In detailed alarm views, enable users to sort and filter alarms by their status, level of severity, time of occurrence, and optionally, other criteria

var object; var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); reqopen("GET", "/objectjson",true); reqonreadystatechange = function () { if (reqreadyState == 4) {

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